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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a crisis of patent quality. Patents are being issued that are 
vague and overbroad, lack novelty, and fail the constitutional mandate 
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."1 Low quality 
patents generate excessive litigation and confer the economic rewards 
of monopoly on patent holders while providing little benefit to the 
public.2 
• Professor and Director, Institute for Information Law & Policy, New York Law School; 
McClatchy Visiting Associate Professor, Communications Department, Stanford University; 
Visiting Scholar, Annenberg School of Communication, University of Pennsylvania. The 
Community Patent Review project can be found at http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent. 
I. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. 
2.See A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 46 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 
2004); see also ADAM 8. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW 
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS 1-8 (2004) 
(arguing that recent changes in the patent system have resulted in increased litigation and a 
greater threat of litigation, creating a net social loss); Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do 
Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 Hous. L. REV. 
1219, 1227-35 (2004) (discussing the social costs of low quality patents); Editorial, The 
Problem with Patents, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2006, at A 18 ("If bad or dubious patents pro-
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This paper argues that access to information is the crux of the 
patent quality problem. Patent examiners currently make decisions 
about the grant of a patent that will shape an industry for a twenty-
year period3 on the basis of a limited subset of available information. 
Examiners may neither consult the public, talk to experts, nor, in 
many cases, even use the Intemet.4 Furthermore, applicants often fail 
to draft clear applications; they are not obligated to supply the patent 
examiner with information necessary to make an informed decision.5 
The burden falls on the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
("USPTO"), whose employees must search for and find the relevant 
technological antecedents, known as "prior art," against which they 
compare and assess the claimed invention.6 
As James Rumsey remarked in a letter to Thomas Jefferson in 
1789, the issuance of patents is "more within the information of a 
board of academical [sic] professors, and a previous refusal of a pat-
ent would better guard our citizens against harassments by lawsuits."7 
Indeed, Jefferson, the first patent examiner, consulted with Joseph 
Hutchinson, Professor of Chemistry at the University of Pennsylvania, 
to seek his advice before issuing a patent on an alchemical process.8 
By contrast, today's patent system replaces expert "academical" 
input with a centralized and isolated expert-bureaucrat evaluating ap-
plications on the basis of a legal fiction - from the viewpoint of the 
"Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art" ("PHOSITA").9 These pat-
ent examiners are underpaid 10 and overworked. 11 They labor inde-
liferate, they can have the opposite of their intended effect, which is to promote and reward 
innovation."). 
3. 35 U.S.C. § I 54(a)(2) (2000). 
4. See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMIN-
ING PROCEDURES§ 904.02(c) (8th ed. 2001) (hereinafter MPEP]. 
5. See Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173, 182-83 (2006). 
6. See id. (arguing for a reduction in the information costs assumed by the US PTO). 
7. E.C. Walterscheid, Thomas Jefferson and the Patent Act of 1793, 40 ESSAYS IN HIST. 
(1998), http://etext.virginia.edu/journals/EH/EH40/walter40.html (quoting Letter from 
James Rumsey to Thomas Jefferson (June 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON, 171 (John Catanzariti et al. eds., 1990)). 
8. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Hutchinson (Mar. 12, 1791 ), in l 9 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 614 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1974) (consulting with a professor 
of chemistry in connection with a patent on a desalination process). 
9. 35 U.S.C. § I 03(a) (2000); see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating 
Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 886 (2004) 
("(The language of§ 103] seems to call for evaluations of nonobviousness from the per-
spective of ordinary practitioners who are contemporaries of the inventor in the relevant 
technological community."). 
I 0. A patent examiner gets paid less than half the salary of a first-year associate prosecut-
ing patents for a large law firm. According to the US PTO, a patent examiner generally starts 
at levels between GS-5 to GS-9, where the salary is between $35,273 and $66,011, and can 
be promoted to GS-14, with a maximum salary of$122,367. USPTO: FAQs, Question 17, 
http://www.usptocareers.gov/faq.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2006); USPTO Specialty Salary 
Rate Table, http://www.usptocareers.gov/salaryrates.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2006). Entry 
level salaries for first-year associates in large New York law firms are approximately 
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pendently under a backlog approaching one million applications,12 
with no more than eighteen to twenty hours to review each one. 13 
There is an absence of communication with the scientific community, 
and examiners are not required to have advanced degrees in the sci-
ences.14 With increasing automation, examiners have less need, and 
hence limited opportunity, to communicate with each other directly, 
resulting in a growing information deficit. 
Rejecting input from experts and remaining unaccountable to the 
scientific community produces problems with information quality and 
transparency at the USPTO. The institutionalized isolation of exper-
tise produces an information deficit that results in poor quality pat-
ents. The reluctance to use outside science translates into undue 
reliance on centralized structures of procedural expertise and deci-
sion-making. This distrust of outside knowledge is compounded by an 
inability to effectively and efficiently engage experts. Thus, the patent 
quality problem is, at least in part, a problem of information access. 15 
This dearth of information - striking in view of the explosion of 
informational resources created by the Internet age - cannot be 
solved through judicial review. At present, even though an over-
whelming percentage of patent applications are granted (with some 
estimates as high as ninety-seven percent), 16 patent owners enjoy a 
$145,000. See Ellen Rosen, For New lawyers, the Going Rate Has Gone Up, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 1, 2006, at C7. 
11. The US PTO has the same number of examiners yet twice the number of applications 
as the European Patent Office. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 131. 
12. At the end of 2005, the number of pending patent applications was 885,002 and ris-
ing. See US PTO, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 120 tbl.3 {2005) [hereinaf-
ter ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2005/ 
2005annualreport.pdf; see also Review of U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Operations, 
Including Analysis of Government Accountability Office, Inspector General, and National 
Academy of Public Administration Reports: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts. the 
Internet, and Intel/. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, I 09th Cong. 14 (2005) (state-
ment of Jon W. Dudas, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property; Director, 
USPTO) ("(W]ithout any change to the system, the backlog of applications awaiting a first 
review by an examiner is expected to grow from the current level of approximately 600,000 
to over 1,000,000 by 2010."). 
13. See U.S. Gov'T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-05-720, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
USPTO HAS MADE PROGRESS IN HIRING EXAMINERS, BUT CHALLENGES TO RETENTION 
REMAIN 28 (2005) ("Depending on the type of patent and the skill level of the examiner, 
each examiner is expected to process an average of 87 applications per year at a rate of I 9 
hours per application."); Kevin Maney, Patent Applications So Abundant that Examiners 
Can't Catch Up, USA TODAY, Sept. 21, 2005, at 38. 
14. "[A] degree from an accredited college or university in Electrical Engineering, Com-
puter Engineering, Computer Science, Mechanical Engineering, Chemical Engineering, 
Material Science Engineering, Biology, [or] Organic Chemistry" will allow an individual to 
become a patent examiner. USPTO: FAQs, supra note IO. 
15. See Petherbridge, supra note 5, at 178 ("[T]ransactions involving questionable pat-
ents ... can be productively considered as problems of information costs and information 
cost allocation."); see also Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. 
L. REV. 465 (2004). 
16. See Cecil D. Quillen et al., Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office - Extended, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 35, 36 (2002); see also 
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presumption of validity. The Federal Circuit, the specialty patent ap-
peals court, rules in favor of patent holders more often than not in 
infringement actions. 17 Yet contrary to prevailing theory, "Daubert-
izing"18 agency decision-making by lowering the current standard of 
judicial review over USPTO decisions is too slow, too irregular, and 
too late in the game to solve the problem, 19 especially as judicial re-
view cannot occur until examination concludes, which can take sev-
eral years.20 
Other reform proposals are also inadequate. Those that call for ex 
post solutions, such as post-grant administrative review to "gold-
plate" important patents,21 require improved mechanisms for access-
ing the information necessary to make the patentability determination. 
Similarly, proposals to change the statutory standards of patent ex-
amination, revisit the scope of patentable subject matter, or modify 
the definition of obviousness do not eliminate the need to address the 
information deficit. They also require extraordinary political capital to 
move through Congress. Even regulatory proposals that require appli-
cants to search more thoroughly for the prior art still require signifi-
cant political support and assume that applicants, including small 
inventors, have the ability to find all the relevant information. 
Patently-0, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/articles_and__publicationslindex.html (Aug. 
26, 2004). 
17. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent 
Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 754 (2000) ("Judges appointed after 1982 voted 
to hold a patent valid 164 times out of298, or 55.0% of the time."); see also Rochelle Coo-
per Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
I, 26-30 (1989); but see Donald R. Dunner, The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit: Its First Three Years, 13 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 186 (1985) ("[W]hat [the re-
sults] show is anything but a bias in favor of patents - either from a validity or an in-
fringement standpoint."). As Professors Dan L. Burk and Mark Lemley remark, "the Federal 
Circuit has bent over backwards to find biotechnological inventions nonobvious, even if the 
prior art demonstrates a clear plan for producing the invention." Dan L. Burk & Mark A. 
Lemley, ls Patent law Technology-Specific? 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002). 
18. See Alan Charles Raul & Julie Zampa Dwyer, "Regulatory Daubert": A Proposal to 
Enhance Judicial Review of Agency Science by Incorporating Daubert Principles into Ad-
ministrative law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (2003) (arguing that the principles of 
Daubert should be applied to administrative agencies "to encourage reviewing judges to be 
less deferential, and thus more probing, of agency science."); see also Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (I 993). 
19. See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: 
Why litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent 
Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943 (2004) (arguing that skewed incentives 
prevent litigation from being a reliable tool for assessing patent validity). 
20. See Ghosh & Kesan, supra note 2, at 1226 ("[C]ourts can only review the validity of 
a patent application ifit is the subject of an opposition or an infringement action."). Average 
pendancy times vary by technology, from two years to over three and a half years. See AN-
NUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 121tbl.4. 
21. See. e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, I 09th Cong. § 9 (2005); Mark Lem-
ley et al., What to Do About Bad Patents?, REGULATION, Winter 2005-2006, at 10, 13 (ar-
guing for "post-grant opposition," described as "a process by which parties other than the 
applicant would have the opportunity to request and fund a thorough examination of a re-
cently issued patent"). 
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What if we could reform the application process and guarantee 
better patents before costly litigation? What if we could ensure that 
only the most worthwhile inventions received twenty years of monop-
oly rights? What if we could offer a way to protect inventors' invest-
ments while still safeguarding the market from bad patents? What if 
we could give the scientific community a voice in determining 
whether an invention was truly novel or obvious? What if we could 
make informed decisions about the scientifically complex issues 
posed by patent law before the fact? 
This Article addresses the contention that an information deficit is 
the central problem in the patent review process by proposing a new 
reform model that might revolutionize the process of patent examina-
tion. This proposal for open patent examination (nicknamed "Peer-to-
Patent") separates scientific from legal decision-making. By means of 
an online network, the scientific community provides what it knows 
best - scientific information relevant to determining the novelty and 
non-obviousness of a patent application. With her deep knowledge of 
the pertinent statutory standards, the patent examiner then uses that 
input to make a legal determination ofpatentability. In this model, the 
patent examiner remains the ultimate arbiter. 
This model for administrative decision-making has the potential 
to remedy the information deficit and improve patent quality. Its en-
actment requires no statutory or regulatory changes. By redesigning 
the model for patent examination, this proposal points the way to-
wards a new approach for administrative law, not by altering statutory 
or judicial standards, but by improving agency institutional compe-
tence. It goes beyond traditional administrative practices like peer 
review by combining expertise with openness. The model also im-
proves on notice-and-comment rulemaking by making citizen partici-
pation more open and collaborative and the legal decision-making 
process more transparent and accountable to a broad community of 
self-selected experts. 
This Article focuses on patent examination as administrative 
practice.22 It shifts the focus to the institutional competence of the 
agency and highlights new opportunities for patent reform. At this 
juncture, when neither Congress23 nor the U.S. Supreme Court24 is 
22. Cf Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent 
System Can learn from Administrative law, 95 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming Nov. 2006), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=897307; Kristen Osenga, En-
trance Ramps, Tolls, and Express lanes - Proposals for Decreasing Traffic Congestion in 
the Patent Office, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119 (2005) (proposing multi-tiered patent applica-
tion and examination system); Farrell & Merges, supra note 19 (arguing that judicial review 
alone cannot fix the patent problem and advocating administrative solutions). 
23. Patent lawyer, academic, and blogger Prof. Dennis Crouch writes: "Substantive pat-
ent reform legislation is dead for the year." Patently-0, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/ 
patent_legislation/index.html (July 28, 2006). 
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certain to enact patent reform, changing the administrative practices 
of the agency responsible for implementing patent law may be the 
best opportunity, not only to effect reform, but also to do so in ways 
that are data-driven and empirically measurable. 
Current administrative structures have been constructed around 
certain beliefs, namely that centralized administrators have the best 
access to information, that expert bureaucrats are the only way to pro-
duce dispassionate decisions, and that making decisions in the public 
interest requires keeping the public at bay. This notion of bureaucratic 
expertise is premised upon a bygone reality, namely that the agency 
possesses the best information. We continue to trust in bureaucratic 
expertise that does not work rather than the collective intelligence that 
the Internet now makes possible.25 
In the spring of 2007, the USPTO will implement the model of 
"Peer-to-Patent" open review as a pilot called Community Patent Re-
view.26 The pilot focuses on integrating an open peer review process 
with the USPTO, creating and amalgamating a vetted database of 
prior art references to inform examination, and developing delibera-
tion methodologies and technologies that allow community ranking of 
the data forwarded to the patent examiner. Community Patent Review 
is the first social software project to be directly connected to and have 
an impact on the legal decision-making process. Several companies, 
representing more than six percent of the total number of new patents, 
including Computer Associates, General Electric, IBM, Microsoft, 
Hewlett-Packard, and Red Hat, have already agreed to submit their 
patent applications for examination under this open system.27 To-
24. While the Supreme Court has heard other patent-related cases this year, the much-
anticipated case reviewing the substantive scope of patentability was not decided on the 
merits. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2976 (2006) 
(dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted). Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
rarely reviews the Federal Circuit. See Mark D. Janis, Patent law in the Age of the Invisible 
Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 387 (2001) ("The Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit, created in 1982, has become the de facto supreme court of patents."). The 2005 
Term was an exception to this practice. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC., 126 S. Ct. 
1837 (2006); Illinois Tool Works, Inc., v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006); Medlm-
mune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1329 (2006) (mem.); KSR Int'! v. Teleflex, 126 S. 
Ct. 2965 (2006) (mem.). 
25. See Yochai Benkler, Coase 's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 
YALE L.J. 369 (2002); see also The Digital Universe, http://www.digitaluniverse.net/ (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2006) (offering collaborative web portals to foster expertise). 
26. USPTO, DRAFT STRATEGIC PLAN 2007-2012 18 (2006), http://www.uspto.gov/ 
web/offices/com/strat2007 /stratplan2007-20 I 2v6.doc [hereinafter DRAFT STRATEGIC 
PLAN]. 
27. See The Peer to Patent Project, http://caims.typepad.com/peertopatent/ (Oct. 24, 
2006). 
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gether with the Omidyar Network and the MacArthur Foundation, 
they will fund this program for the USPT0.28 
We have arrived at a unique moment in history when five factors 
converge to make this kind of reform proposal possible: first, the state 
of patenting has become so problematic as to meet with almost uni-
versal opprobrium; second, the majority of patent applications are 
published after eighteen months whether ultimately granted or not,29 
providing the legal foundation for open review; third, expert public 
participation in the form of peer review is widely practiced in the pub-
lic sector and therefore is a familiar model; fourth, we have social 
reputation and networking technology that makes open review on this 
scale possible; and fifth, we have the necessary expertise with col-
laborative decision-making systems to be able to design and construct 
a new model of administrative practice for the USPTO. 
This Article describes the patent system's information deficit 
problem and outlines a detailed draft blueprint for the Community 
Patent Review pilot. Part II discusses the current state of patent law 
and patent examination in the United States and the problems to 
which it gives rise. It demonstrates how the information deficit ham-
pers effective patent review. 
Part III explains that traditional peer review is not a solution to 
the informational deficit because it lacks transparency, has a closed 
vision of expertise, and places undue burdens on scientists and agency 
officials. As traditionally practiced, it also comes too late in the game 
to be useful to remedy the information deficit that impedes quality 
decision-making. 
Part IV sets out the proposal for open peer review and argues for 
opening up patent examination, not to authenticated experts, but to the 
collective community. Open review combines the transparency and 
self-selection of public participation with the structured practices and 
expertise of peer review. Metaphorically, it marries the practices of 
Wikipedia to the authority of administrative law.30 This section de-
scribes the design features of the Community Patent Review Pilot that 
will implement the model. 
Part V explains how open review helps to solve the patent quality 
problem, is superior to alternative reforms, and benefits the public. It 
does so by anticipating objections in a question and answer format. 
28. The pilot project is designed and run by the author under the auspices of the New 
York Law School Institute for Information Law & Policy. See The Peer to Patent Project, 
http://www.dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2006). 
29. Under the current rule, most patent applications are published after eighteen months, 
unless the applicant (1) requests otherwise and (2) is not required to publish the application 
in a foreign jurisdiction. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2000). The Patent Reform Act of 2005 would 
eliminate this exception. H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 9(a) (2005). 
30. See Nicholas Varchaver, Patent Review Goes Wiki, FORTUNE, Aug. 21, 2006, at 18. 
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The Article then concludes with a discussion on institutional 
competence, claiming that by applying technology to improve the 
patent examination process itself, we can bring about legal reform 
faster than traditional strategies that view Congress and the courts as 
the only institutional mechanisms for change, and in so doing, capture 
the benefits of empirical experimentation. 
Patent examination urgently needs improvement to remedy the in-
formational deficit that gives rise to low quality patents. Open review 
offers the structure through which we can tie public participation to 
governmental decision-making in ways that are manageable and use-
ful. At the same time, the empirical lessons to be learned from reform-
ing examination at the USPTO promise to benefit not only intellectual 
property law and policy, but administrative practice in general. 
II. THE PARADE OF HORRIBLES: INFORMATION DEFICIT AND 
PATENT QUALITY 
Abraham Lincoln said that the "patent system added the fuel of 
interest to the fire of genius."31 At the founding, it was an inexpensive 
way for the new federal government to provide a utilitarian basis to 
stimulate innovation.32 It was also one of the only constitutional 
clauses incorporated without debate.33 Perhaps this was because the 
delegates felt, as Mark Twain later expressed it, that "a country with-
out a patent office and good patent laws was just a crab and couldn't 
travel any way but sideways or backwards."34 
While patents have provided an incentive for national competi-
tiveness and stimulated investment in new technologies,35 there is a 
general consensus that the crab is traveling backwards: many perceive 
the system to be broken. At a minimum, an issued patent must set 
forth an invention that is novel, useful, non-obvious, and described 
with enough specificity to be practiced.36 Yet of the two million pat-
ents in force in the United States,37 many do not qualify. The patent 
31. Abraham Lincoln, Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions (Feb. 11, 1859), in ABRA-
HAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865 3, 11 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 
1989). 
32. See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 18 {2002). 
33.Seeid at 107-10. 
34. MARK TWAIN, A CONNECTICUT YANKEE IN KING ARTHUR'S COURT 58 (Signet Clas-
sics 2004) (1889). 
35. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) ("From 
their inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance between the need to 
promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are 
both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood ofa competitive economy."). 
36. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
37. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
1501 (2001). 
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awarded to Smucker's for the crustless peanut butter and jelly sand-
wich is, by now, legendary.38 Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner regale the 
reader in their book Innovation and Its Discontents39 with many more 
horror stories of patents that are anything but "non-obvious" - for 
example, a patent awarded to a five-year-old boy for "Method of 
Swinging on a Swing"40 and a patent on a method for drafting a pat-
ent.41 The "Patently Silly" weblog has dozens more.42 Even lawyers 
are getting into the game, seeking to patent estate planning and other 
legal techniques that have been practiced in the industry for decades.43 
An industry has arisen in patent "trolling," where participants 
seek patents solely for the purpose of initiating infringement lawsuits 
and extorting licensing fees from competitors without producing any 
product or bringing any innovation to the market.44 Patent law pro-
vides the inventor with a monopoly right to exclude others from us-
ing, selling, making, or practicing the invention,45 but does not impose 
a concomitant obligation to do the same.46 This means, for example, 
that the oil industry could patent solar energy inventions that will be 
put on the shelf and never used. Since "anything under the sun"47 can 
be patentable subject matter and more people are filing patents than 
ever before,48 the field is fertile for companies seeking to patent unde-
serving inventions and to profit from the threat of litigation rather than 
from productive research and development.49 Of course, patenting 
activity may also reflect productive invention. But a low quality pat-
ent over a fundamental research method, if issued, runs the risk of 
impeding downstream invention and hampering scientific innovation. 
38. U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 (filed Dec. 8, 1997). 
39. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2; see also Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: 
The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1559 (2006) (reviewing JAFFE & LERNER, 
supra). 
40. U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000). 
41. Machine for Drafting a Patent Application and Process for Doing Same, U.S. Patent 
No. 6,574,645 (filed Feb. 19, 2002). 
42. Patently Silly, http://www.patentlysilly.com/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2006). 
43. See Establishing and Managing Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts Funded by Non-
qualified Stock Options, U.S. Patent No. 6,567,790 (filed Dec. l, 1999). At least one author 
has advocated against granting patents for legal methods. See Andrew A. Schwartz, The 
Patent Office Meets the Poison Pill: Why legal Methods Cannot Be Patented, 20 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming Spring 2007). 
44. See Zachary Roth, The Monopoly Factory, WASH.MONTHLY, June 2005, at 12, 18. 
45. 35 u.s.c. § 154(d)(l) (2000). 
46. See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908). 
47. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) ("Congress intended statutory 
subject matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man."') (quoting S. REP. 
No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, 6 (1952)). 
48. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical Ex-
ploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2099 (2000) ("[l]ndividuals and 
companies are obtaining far more patents today than ever before."). 
49. See Manny W. Schecter, Open Collaboration is Medicine for Our Ailing Patent Sys-
tem, 72 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 682, 682-85 (2006) (explaining the connection 
between low quality patents and the costs of increased litigation from patent trolling). 
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The problem is that as old and obvious as an idea might seem, 
finding the relevant written information to invalidate it during the re-
view process can be quite difficult, especially under the time and re-
source constraints created by the backlog and with double the number 
of applications as there were ten years ago.50 This creates an opportu-
nity for individuals to exploit the deficiencies in the system. 
The USPTO is awarding patents improvidently because of a lack 
of access to adequate information and an inability to apply it effec-
tively. Bureaucrats are supposed to possess "the knowledge that 
comes from specialized experience."51 Yet the reality is that fifty-five 
percent of patent examiners - supposedly expert bureaucrats - have 
been employed by the USPTO for fewer than two years, and examin-
ers are not required to possess an advanced degree. 52 They are also 
underpaid, earning approximately $55,000 a year while an associate in 
a Manhattan law firm earns a base salary of $145,000.53 While not all 
patent examiners are lawyers eligible for law firm jobs, the USPTO 
still cannot hire quickly enough to keep pace with both the demands 
of the job and the attrition rate.54 Arguably, the USPTO today pro-
duces no better results than the registration regime the United States 
abandoned in 1836. 55 
Patent examiners enjoy a great deal more discretion than their bu-
reaucratic counterparts at other agencies. Patent examiners are respon-
sible for granting a twenty-year monopoly when a first- or second-
year civil servant at another agency would be drafting memoranda.56 
50. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 119 tbl. 2. 
51. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative law, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1669, 1678 (1975). 
52. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 135-36. 
53. See supra note I 0. 
54. There are currently over 4000 patent examiners with plans to increase that number to 
7200 in order to address the backlog. See DRAFT STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 26, at 13. 
Id. 
This level of hiring is a critical component of the plans [sic] to ad-
dress patent pendency regardless of the time frame for such im-
provements. Notwithstanding these massive hiring efforts, in the 
absence of other changes to the current examination system only 
modest gains in reducing patent pendency are likely to be achieved in 
the near term. In fact, until these new hires are effectively absorbed 
into the examination system, average patent pendency will continue 
to increase. 
55. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 142; see also Giles S. Rich, laying the Ghost 
of the "Invention" Requirement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 163, 165 (2004) ("[T]he examination 
system as set up under the first patent act proved unworkable and the Act of 1793 was 
passed under which we went to a registration system for 43 years. That too was unworkable 
and by the Act of 1836 we established the Patent Office .... "). 
56. See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 2, at 138 ("[l]nexperienced, underpaid, and over-
worked patent examiners are making decisions on final administrative actions in a way that 
their equally junior counterparts at other agencies are not."). 
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The problems that result from examiners' wide-ranging discretion are 
exacerbated by increasing judicial deference to their decisions.57 
An understanding of the examination process and how informa-
tion is retrieved illustrates the effect of the USPTO's inadequate ac-
cess to relevant scientific resources. Inventors apply for one of three 
types of patents: utility, plant, or design. I focus on utility patents for 
my description of the review process because they are more numer-
ous, complex, and economically significant. Utility patents are those 
that cover "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."58 
This definition of patentable subject matter is construed broadly to 
cover "anything under the sun,"59 including business methods,60 com-
puter algorithms,61 and even living organisms.62 However, laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.63 
An inventor files an application electronically or by mail64 to se-
cure a filing date from which the twenty-year period of exclusivity 
will begin ifthe patent is granted.65 This application contains a "speci-
fication," illustrations, an oath as to its ownership and truthfulness, 
and, of course, the requisite filing fee.66 The specification includes a 
narrative description of the invention with details as to its background 
and any context necessary to understand its inventive contribution.67 
The specification must contain a written description of the invention 
being claimed.68 Finally, the specification discloses the metes and 
bounds of the invention through the patent's "claims," which are the 
formalistic statements of the scope of the invention.69 The application 
must also set forth the "best mode" for implementing the invention.70 
There is a well-established information taxonomy by which pat-
ents are sorted and organized. The USPTO labels the application with 
one of about 450 class and about 150,000 sub-class designations to 
57. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical 
Research On Patent litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. I, 18-19 & n.93 (2005) (discuss-
ing an empirical study of patent validity and noting an increasing validity rate since the 
creation of the Federal Circuit). 
58. 35 U.S.C. § IOI (2000). 
59. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
60. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed 
Cir. 1998). 
61. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185-87 (1981) 
62. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. 
63. MPEP, supra note 4, § 2105. 
64. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.8, 1.52 (2006). 
65. 35 U.S.C. § I 54(a)(2) (2000). 
66. Id. § l l l(a)(3). 
67. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.71. 
68. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
69. Id. 
70. Id. The best mode requirement ensures that the public learns the best way to use the 
invention. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Lab. Inc., 251F.3d955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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enable indexing, sorting, and retrieval of the relevant application and 
materials.71 
In the course of the ensuing patent review, known as patent 
prosecution, the examiner may correspond with the inventor in a se-
ries of colloquies known as "office actions," whereby the examiner 
rejects and the applicant amends the pending application.72 The inven-
tor can amend the application during prosecution in an effort to nar-
row the claims until they are allowable.73 Even if the examiner 
eventually rejects the application, an inventor may respond by filing a 
continuation74 or amendment75 or by filing an appeal with the Board 
of Patent Appeals and Interferences. 76 Prosecution ends when the pat-
ent is either granted or the application is abandoned. 
The examiner reviews an application under five major statutory 
· · bl b' 11 •1. 18 l 19 cntena: patenta e su ~ect matter, ut1 1ty, nove ty, non-
obviousness,80 and enablement.81 The subject matter requirement 
screens erroneously filed applications as well as applications directed 
to an idea, conception, law of nature, or similarly abstract phenome-
non. 82 The utility requirement dictates that patents issue for operable 
and functioning inventions and that these inventions serve a public 
purpose.83 Patents are seldom rejected for lack ofutility.84 
The core of the examination centers around two inquiries: novelty 
and non-obviousness. Novelty asks whether the invention is new.85 
Non-obviousness asks whether the invention is more than an obvious 
advance over what came before from the perspective of one with or-
dinary skill in the field of the invention.86 
To decide the question of novelty, the examiner asks whether the 
claimed invention differs from previous inventions. This requires a 
71. See USPTO, Classification Help File, http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/ 
classification/help.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2006). 
72. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2006). 
73. Id.§ l.l l l(c)(2006). 
74. See id § 1.114 (2006). 
75. See id. § 1.116 (2006). 
76. See 35 U.S.C. § 134 (2000). 
77. See id§ IOI (2000) (allowing grant ofa patent for "any new and useful process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof'). 
78. See Brennerv. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1966); see also 35 U.S.C. §§IOI, 112 
(2000). 
79. 35 u.s.c. § 102 (2000). 
80. /d § 103. 
81. See id. § 112. 
82. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981 ). 
83. See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534-35. 
84. The utility requirement is generally a more significant hurdle for pharmaceutical 
products and biotechnology than for mechanical inventions. I DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM 
ON PATENTS§ 4.01 (2006) (citing In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
85. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 190. 
86. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). 
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search for the "prior art" - the potentially pre-empting knowledge 
that existed at the time of the invention. Prior art is not limited to pat-
ents or patent applications. It can include published materials, such as 
journal articles, websites, or other disclosures, that might suggest that 
the invention is not new. 87 
The examiner's options for searching the prior art are limited. 
Patent examiners, especially those who are unable to use the Internet, 
must rely on three computer systems in place at the USPTO: Exam-
iner's Automated Search Tool ("EAST"), Web-Based Examiner 
Search Tool ("WEST"), and Foreign Patent Access System 
("FPAS"). 88 These databases provide access to prior U.S. patents, for-
eign patent abstracts, certain pending U.S. applications, and additional 
proprietary database libraries. 89 The US PTO databases are not exhaus-
tive. While an examiner might be inclined to use Google to look up 
information online, the use of Internet research is restricted for secu-
rity reasons, as there is a risk that examiner searching could be 
tracked.90 In effect, the examiner is limited to internal sources avail-
able at the office. 
Empirical data confirms the inadequacy of USPTO search capa-
bilities. In a recent study of 502,687 utility patents, examiners were 
found to have a disadvantage in searching for non-patent prior art or 
foreign patents.91 Interestingly, while patent examiners accounted for 
forty-one percent of the citations to previous U.S. patents, they ac-
counted for only ten percent of references to non-patent prior art.92 
The study concludes that this gap is due to inferior search capabilities 
for prior art other than U.S. Patents.93 
Examiners are not independently finding what they need, and ap-
plicants are not required to provide it.94 Furthermore, third parties are 
87. See I CHISUM, supra note 84, § 3.04. 
88. MPEP, supra note 4, § 902.03(e). 
89. See id. 
90. See MPEP, supra note 4, § 904.02(c) ("This policy also applies to use of the Internet 
as a communications medium for connecting to commercial database providers."); Internet 
Usage Policy, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,101, 57,103 (Oct. 26, 1998) ("If security and confidentiality 
cannot be attained for a specific use, transaction, or activity, then that specific use, transac-
tion, or activity shall NOT be undertaken/conducted."). 
91. Shaven N. Sampat, Determinants of Patent Quality: An Empirical Analysis, 2-3 
(Sept. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/programs/ 
SST_ Seminars/patentquality _ new.pdf_ 1.pdf. 
92. Id. at 8. 
93.Seeid. at 13. 
94. An applicant is required to disclose any information that is material to the prosecution 
of the patent. 37 C.F.R. § l.63(b)(3) (2006). "[A]n applicant and his or her patent attorney 
[traditionally) were under no duty to conduct a search of the prior art." 6 CHISUM, supra 
note 84, § J 9.03(2)(b)(i). Sometimes applicants file no prior art at all. See, e.g., Patent 
Chronicles, http://www.patentchronicles.com/ (Mar. 23, 2005, 15:30 EST). The USPTO has 
proposed a rule change to "encourage patent applicants to provide the USPTO the most 
relevant information related to their inventions in the early stages of the review process." 
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not reliable sources of information. In part, this is because Congress 
directed that the USPTO structure its procedures to prevent "protest 
or ... pre-issuance opposition."95 Hence, independent third-party in-
put is greatly restricted; it must be made by mail, within a two-month 
window, for a fee of $180, and without commentary.96 Not surpris-
ingly, third-party input is rarely given. There were between forty and 
one hundred third party comments filed in 2005.97 In sum, "the infor-
mational burdens on the examiner are clearly heavy - even before 
the examiner engages in the heavy lifting of interpreting the prior 
art."98 
This gives rise to a "Goldilocks problem": too little information,99 
too much information, and none of it just right. In searching for prior 
art - such as other patents or journal articles, websites, or other dis-
closures that might suggest that the invention is not new - the exam-
iner sometimes finds nothing. While the patent may seem familiar to 
an examiner, often she cannot find other written material that actually 
teaches the claims of the patent. This is particularly the case in cut-
ting-edge areas of innovation, such as business methods, where there 
is not a large pool of patents from which relevant prior art may be 
drawn. '00 Alternatively, the examiner is so inundated with related 
prior art, such as in the biotechnology field, that she has trouble re-
viewing the application, winnowing the material, and finding art that 
is relevant and useful for the examination process in the time allot-
ted.101 
It is not enough to ensure that the invention is new. The crux of 
the patentability determination is whether the invention represents a 
Changes To Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related Matters, 71 
Fed. Reg. 38,808 (July I 0, 2006). 
95. 35 U.S.C.S. § I 22(c) (2006). 
96. See MPEP, supra note 4, § 1134.01; 37 C.F.R. § 1.99 (2006). The patent examiner 
may not respond to the third party, except to process the fee. Robert Clarke, Deputy Direc-
tor, Office of Patent Legal Administration, Presentation at Meeting of the US PTO (Feb. 16, 
2006), http://cairns.typepad.com/peertopatent/files/community _patent_ and _pto2 l 3v2.ppt. 
97. Robert Clarke, Deputy Director, Office of Patent Legal Administration, Remarks at 
Meeting of the Community Patent Review Steering Committee (Sept. 11, 2006). 
98. Petherbridge, supra note 5, at 183. 
99. See Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 763, 763 (2002) ("It is widely recognized that the Patent Office grants overly-
broad patents because it has deficient knowledge of the relevant prior art, especially in high 
technology areas with significant nonpatent prior art."). 
I 00. After the Federal Circuit made clear in 1998 that business methods were patentable 
subject matter, see State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the number of applications for business method patents rose 
dramatically. See John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving 
Patent Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 729, 730-31 (2006). Patent examiners have had difficulty finding "written refer-
ences stating common knowledge" in this emerging field. See Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power 
over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907, 914 (2004). 
IOI. See Eli Kintisch, US Patent Policy: PTO Wants to Tap Experts to Help Examiners, 
312 SCIENCE 982, 982 (2006). 
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significant enough advance over what came before. This decision is 
made from the perspective of the relevant expert, the "person having 
ordinary skill in the art to which [the] subject matter pertains."102 As 
patent scholar Rebecca Eisenberg explains: 
[T]his language seems to call for evaluations of non-
obviousness from the perspective of ordinary practi-
tioners who are contemporaries of the inventor in the 
relevant technological community. It specifies a 
point in time as to which the obviousness of the in-
vention should be evaluated ("at the time the inven-
tion was made") and designates the person whose 
judgment of obviousness should control ("to a per-
son having ordinary skill in the art to which said sub-
ject matter pertains" or PHOSIT A), as well as 
directing attention to "the differences between the 
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior 
art."103 
The examiner's manual suggests three bases for assessing obvi-
ousness. First, there must be "some suggestion or motivation" avail-
able to one having ordinary skill in the art "to modify the reference or 
to combine reference teachings." Second, "there must be a reasonable 
expectation" that the invention will succeed. Finally, the prior art ref-
erences, whether alone or in combination, "must teach or suggest all 
the claim limitations."104 
Essential to this determination is that the examiner put herself in 
the shoes of the fictional person skilled in the art and render a deter-
mination through his eyes and not her own. This requires identifying 
the person and what characterizes his skill set. 105 The person skilled in 
the art is considered to be the best metric for the scope, content, and 
meaning of prior references. 
Assessing the relevant information through the eyes of this fic-
tional legal expert is an added burden on the examiner. The difficulty 
Id. 
I 02. 35 U.S.C. § I 03(a) (2000). 
103. Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 886 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000)). 
I 04. MPEP, supra note 4, § 706.020). 
105. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I, 17-18 (1966). 
Under § I 03, the scope and content of the prior art are to be deter-
mined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to 
be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art re-
solved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness 
of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as 
commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, 
etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding 
the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of 
obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy. 
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of this task is illustrated by the fact that courts have largely given up 
on applying the standard: 
Today, PHOSITA sits on the sidelines of obvious-
ness analysis. Courts consult PHOSIT A on the 
scope, content and meaning of prior art references 
but not on the ultimate question of whether the in-
vention would have been obvious at the time it was 
made in light of the prior art. The resulting analysis 
excludes from consideration the judgment, intuition 
and tacit knowledge of ordinary practitioners in the 
field that cannot be documented in the written re-
cord.106 
In sum, to prevent the corruption of the examiner and unfairness 
to the applicant, USPTO procedures prescribe an insular process for 
patent application review. Examiners must rely on internal databases 
and are not permitted to consult outside sources. While the public may 
submit limited prior art, they may not submit any commentary or 
analysis after publication and before the grant of the patent applica-
tion. The resulting information deficit inevitably results in patents 
issued without the benefit of the appropriate prior art or the perspec-
tive that could be brought to bear by expert inquiry. A solution to the 
problems that plague the examination process ought to help the exam-
iner find the best information while allowing her to maintain her role 
as the ultimate legal arbiter ofpatentability. 
Ill. WHY TRADITIONAL PEER REVIEW IS NOT THE SOLUTION 
Peer review is the traditional solution proposed for the informa-
tion deficit and information quality problems of administrative agen-
cies.107 I pause to consider, therefore, whether traditional peer review 
panels would solve these problems for the patent examination process. 
This Part concludes that because of a lack of transparency, traditional 
peer review is inappropriate in this context. 
I 06. Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 888. 
107. See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFfH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICY MAK-
ERS 61-84 ( 1990); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, JOSHUA B. BOLTEN, ISSUANCE OMB 'S 
FINAL INFORMATION QUALITY BULLETIN FOR PEER REVIEW, OMB Memorandum M-05-03 
(Dec. 16, 2004 ). 
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Peer review is commonly used in govemment, 108 and is often a 
key part of the process of awarding research grants. 109 The National 
Science Foundation currently relies on a network of over 50,000 re-
viewers.110 The National Institutes of Health relies on outside review 
groups and advisory councils from the scientific community to review 
about seventy percent of its grant applications. 111 The Environmental 
Protection Agency grant selection process "relies heavily upon ... 
Science Review Panels," which are peer review groups chosen and 
db 'd . . 112 manage y an outst e sc1ent1st. 
Refereeing procedures have come to be regarded as 
the most effective method of validating science in 
two quite different spheres of professional activity: 
prepublication review of journal articles and screen-
ing of applications by federal research-sponsoring 
agencies. There is thus an appealing logic to the syl-
logism that links peer review to "good science" in 
the regulatory process. 113 
Peer review is also used to evaluate policy data and provide a 
mechanism for oversight of agency science. Congress has tried to im-
prove the quality of information that agencies use and disseminate in 
other settings by increasing the use of peer review under the Informa-
tion Quality Act ("IQA"). 114 Under the Office of Management and 
I 08. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL RESEARCH: PEER REVIEW 
PRACTICES AT FEDERAL SCIENCE AGENCIES VARY, GAO/RCED-99-99 (1999); U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PEER REVIEW: EPA NEEDS IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES AND 
ADDITIONAL CONTROLS, GAO/IRCED-94-98 (1994); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
PEER REVIEW: REFORMS NEEDED TO ENSURE FAIRNESS IN FEDERAL AGENCY GRANT SE-
LECTION, GAO/PEMD-94-1 (1994); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PEER REVIEW: COM-
PLIANCE WITH THE PRIVACY ACT AND FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT, GAO/GGD-
91-48 (1991); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES: GSA'S 
MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND GAO COMMENTS ON PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE AMEND-
MENTS, GAOff-GGD-89-1 (1988); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ACT: GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION'S MANAGEMENT OF ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES, GA0/GGD89-10 (1988); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, UNI-
VERSITY FUNDING: INFORMATION ON THE ROLE OF PEER REVIEW AT NSF AND NIH, 
GAO/WED-87-87FS (1987); see also Lars Noah, Scientific "Republicanism": Expert Peer 
Review and the Quest for Regulatory Deliberation, 49 EMORY L.J. 1033, 1047 (2000) (dis-
cussing various ways peer review is used in government). 
I 09. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL RESEARCH: PEER REVIEW PRAC-
TICES AT FEDERAL SCIENCE AGENCIES VARY, supra note 108, at 2. 
110. See Nat'I Sci. Found., How We Work, http://www.nsf.gov/about/how.jsp (last vis-
ited Oct. 20, 2006); see also Thomas 0. McGarity, Peer Review in Awarding Federal 
Grants in the Arts and Sciences, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. I, 15 (1994). 
111. Nat'! Insts. of Health, About the Center for Scientific Review, 
http://cms.csr.nih.gov/AboutCSR/Welcome+to+CSR (last visited Oct. 20, 2006). 
112. McGarity, supra note 110, at 27. 
113. JASANOFF,supra note 107, at 61. 
114. See Lisa Heinzerling, Risking It All, 57 ALA. L. REV. 103, 111 (2005) (describing 
the IQA as "a one paragraph measure slipped into an appropriations bill without debate"); 
140 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 20 
Budget ("OMB") Agency Information Quality Guidelines, independ-
ent peer review of data creates a presumption that the data is of suffi-
cient objectivity to be disseminated. 115 In its Final Information 
Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, OMB mandates that agencies em-
ploy peer review. The Bulletin sets forth detailed requirements for 
peer review that focused on "timing of peer reviews, selection of re-
viewers, transparency of review, and opportunities for public partici-
pation."116 
This predilection for peer review is not surprising since both 
agencies and the scientific community have longstanding experience 
with peer review practices. 117 Such regularized review processes are 
well-suited to the workings of administrative agencies: 
[T]he postwar intellectual and political project in 
policymaking became the reconciliation of the prac-
tical necessity of broad administrative discretion 
with this emerging pluralist norm. The "solution" 
was found in the idea of administrative process. 
Henceforth, public administrators would become 
managers of neutral processes designed to discover 
"optimal" public policies. The hallmark of the ad-
ministrator became procedural expertise in using a 
set of techniques applicable to all sorts of public 
problems rather than substantive expertise in solving 
particular kinds. 118 
At first glance, traditional peer review appears to be a fairly conserva-
tive means to attack the information quality problem and seems to 
provide much needed oversight and accountability. 
Unfortunately, peer review is fraught with problems that under-
mine its credibility. 119 This has prompted several leading scientific 
see also Act of Dec. 21, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554 app. C, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-
153 to 154 (2000) (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3516 note (2000)). 
115. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Information Quality Guidelines, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 
8459 (Feb. 22, 2002). 
116. Stephen Johnson, Reforming the Information Quality Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 60 
(2005); see also Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664, 
2665 (Jan. 14, 2005). 
117. See Mohammed Kashef, Scientific Peer Review in the Public Sector 1 (Dec. 5, 
2005), http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/peerreview_dec05.pdf ("[Peer review] is an 
integral practice to the development of quality research in the private and public sectors, in 
industry and in education because the process of peer review allows even a large group of 
scientists, regardless of geographic proximity, to collaborate on the evaluation of innova-
tion."). 
118. Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive 
Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1619 (1985). 
119. See JASANOFF, supra note 107, at 69-76; Wendy E. Wagner, The "Bad Science" 
Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over the Role of Science in Public Health and Environ-
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organizations to attack existing governmental peer review frame-
works.120 These problems stem from the fact that it is an elite, closed 
process and therefore subject to manipulation. Though the process is 
not secretive, 121 it is closed in the sense that agency peer review 
groups are empanelled, not self-selected. As a result, only certain 
kinds of industry and academic experts will typically be invited. It is 
therefore possible to stack the deck with ideologues, creating peer 
review mechanisms that are characterized not by deliberative dis-
agreement but by unproductive conflict. The selection criteria need 
not be based on politics - though a political litmus test is frequently 
imposed122 - but they may be based on educational or social status, 
thereby shutting out otherwise qualified and meaningful contributors. 
Because there is no single definition of peer review, 123 the mere 
fact that an agency employs a process by the name of "peer review" 
does not ensure transparency or quality. There are no assurances that 
mental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 67-71. (2003); Sidney A. Shapiro, 
Politicizing Peer Review: The legal Perspective, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS 
238-254 (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 2006). 
120. See OMB Watch, Peer Review News, http://www.ombwatch.org/article/archive/232 
(last visited Oct. I 0, 2006) (archiving objections to OMB peer review guidelines); see also 
DefendingScience.org, OMB's Peer Review Guidelines, http://www.defendingscience.org/ 
public_health_regulations/peer_review_guidelines.cfm (last visited Sept. 24, 2006); Chris 
Mooney, Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal, The Poli-
tics of Peer Review, Jan. 8, 2004, http://www.csicop.org/doubtandabout/peerreview/ 
("(Y)ou might expect that a recent White House Office of Management and Budget pro-
posal to expand the use of peer review in the evaluation of scientific research conducted by 
federal agencies would find a warm welcome from scientists. You'd be dead wrong. Scien-
tific heavyweights like the American Public Health Association, the Association of Ameri-
can Medical Colleges, and the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology 
have issued scathing critiques of the proposal (the latter two jointly), as have a range of 
other organizations and experts. The hallowed American Association for the Advancement 
of Science - which publishes the preeminent peer reviewed journal Science - also has 
worries about the idea. A group of Democratic members of Congress even dubbed it a 'wolf 
in sheep's clothing."'). 
121. The Federal Advisory Committee Act ensures that advice rendered by advisory 
committees is open and accessible. 5 U.S.C. app § 2 (2000). 
122. To serve on the NIH Drug Abuse panel, candidates were asked if they had voted for 
President Bush. See William R. Miller, Litmus Test for Appointees at the National Institute 
on Drug Abuse (2004), http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/interference/ 
nih-drug-abuse-panel.html. This is not the only recent example of political pressures coming 
to bear on scientific policymaking. See Union of Concerned Scientists, Political Litmus 
Tests at the Fogarty International Center, http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/ 
interference/fogarty-international-center-advisory-board.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2006) 
("(M]ore scientists have disclosed their personal experiences with political litmus tests 
applied by the Bush administration in the appointment process for a wide range of scientific 
advisory positions."); Union of Concerned Scientists, Scientific Integrity in Policy Making: 
An Investigation into the Bush Administration's Abuse of Science, http://www.ucsusa.org/ 
scienti fie_ integrity /interference/reports-scienti fic-i ntegri ty-in-po I icy-making. htm I 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2006) (describing general patterns of political influence on the process 
of scientific policy making). 
123. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review, 84 WASH. 
U. L. REV. I, 14 (2006) (arguing that the right type of peer review can play a role in appro-
priate circumstances). 
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what they do is based on good science rather than political prejudice. 
The Government Accountability Office ("GAO") has found, for ex-
ample, that "further improvements are needed to expand the scope of 
peer reviews [at the EPA] and make them more independent," and 
that the implementation of the EPA's peer review policy has been 
"uneven."124 
Peer review is also time-consuming to organize125 and run. 126 Be-
cause the group has to be selected, vetted, and approved, disputes can 
arise over membership. Conflicts of interest have to be identified and 
sorted out. Participants have to be convinced to join. Not only does 
the composition of the group need to be defended, but the convenor 
may have to defend the scope of work. Hence, setting up peer review 
panels requires setting boundaries and, subsequently, policing and 
defending those boundaries. 
It is, perhaps, in part because of the work required to maintain a 
peer review system that review generally happens late in the proc-
ess - too late to have a significant impact on regulatory decision-
making. Agencies ask for public comment once a rule is already writ-
ten, often allotting the public only a short window in which to provide 
feedback 127 and leaving little room for meaningful change. 
The closed process fits well, however, with the culture and prac-
tice of agencies. "By deferring to expertise and asserting it ourselves, 
we help create a world organized around the pretense that some peo-
ple, armed and limited by their special knowledge, can be trusted to 
be in charge," writes Professor Gerald Frug. 128 Closed peer review 
124. Raul & Dwyer, supra note 18, at 13; see also id. at 7 n.24 ("[The] GAO has identi-
fied several weaknesses in EPA's science programs over the years, including (1) the uneven 
implementation of peer review procedures for EPA's scientific and technical products, (2) 
gaps in scientific data, and (3) the lack of performance goals and measures that show the 
environmental results of EPA's science activities.") (quoting U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT: INFORMATION ON SCIENCE ISSUES 
IN EPA 'S PERFORMANCE REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999 AND PERFORMANCE PLANS FOR 
FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2001, No. 00-270 (2000)). 
125. See Sidney Shapiro, Data Quality: The Data Quality Appropriations Rider: New 
Procedures and Information Disclosure, Center for Progressive Reform, 
http://www.progressiveregulation.org/perspectives/dataQuality.cfm (last visited Aug. 14, 
2006) ("(P]rocedural requirements have an important side effect - they slow down the 
government's capacity to act and, if they are sufficiently burdensome, they can bring gov-
ernment to a standstill. As a result, the benefits of imposing additional procedures have to be 
balanced against the consequences to the public of delaying agency action."). 
126. See Megan Sever, Government Peer Review, GEOTIMES (Nov. 2003), 
http://www.agiweb.org/geotimes/nov03/NN_peerrev.html ("Opponents, however, warn that 
the [peer review] standards could paralyze new regulations, especially on issues such as 
global warming, or air or water pollution, where the risks and benefits are complex, politi-
cally charged and potentially costly."). 
127. The Administrative Procedure Act provides for a minimum window of 30 days of 
public consultation. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), (d) (2006). 
128. Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
1276, 1333 (1984) (emphasis omitted). Frug goes on to point out, quoting the moral phi-
losopher Alasdair Macintyre, that '"Bureaucratic Man' can thrive only if all of us invent a 
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arguably supports this self-proclaimed expertise by lending credibility 
to the agency's assertion of expert knowledge. 
IV. "PEER TO PATENT": THE OPEN REVIEW ALTERNATIVE 
Institutional processes are needed to overcome the problems of 
closed peer review and create more transparent mechanisms that bring 
scientific expertise to bear earlier in the patent review process. Doing 
so should not be overly time-consuming and burdensome for the pat-
ent examiner or for long-suffering inventors who are already waiting 
years in line at the USPTO. 
In other domains, the combination of open technology and well-
defined process has successfully enabled a distributed group to share 
expertise. Open self-selection, rather than closed peer review, makes 
it possible for Wikipedia to harness public knowledge and create an 
encyclopedia with over one million entries129 of quality comparable to 
that of traditional, centrally edited encyclopedias. 130 New technology 
has enabled Amazon to create a marketplace, not just for the sale of 
goods and services, but also for the aggregation of expertise and rec-
ommendations about those goods and services. 131 CNET offers a plat-
form to share expertise about electronics and technology. 132 The 
Internet Movie Database, the largest repository of information about 
cinema, draws much of its content from volunteers submitting data 
about films and movie stars. 133 The Public Library of Science, the 
pioneering open access publisher of scientific journals, is launching 
PLoS ONE, a distributed knowledge network to enable scholars of 
biology and medicine to discuss published research literature. 134 
fiction of expertise that assigns to the character of the 'broad-gauged' leader a role that 
justifies our own powerlessness." Id. 
129. See Wikipedia, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia (as of Nov. 20, 
2006, 06:40 GMT) (stating that, as of this writing, there are over 1,400,000 entries). 
130. See Jim Giles, Internet Encyclopaedias Go Head to Head, 438 NATURE 900 (2005) 
(discussing a Nature study demonstrating that Wikipedia is about as accurate as Encyclope-
dia Britannica). 
131. See Shay David & Trevor Pinch, Six Degrees of Reputation: The Use and Abuse of 
Online Review and Recommendation Systems, FIRST MONDAY, March 2006, 
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue 11 _3/david/index _original.html (describing strate-
gies and techniques of user reviews and recommendations on Amazon). 
132. See CNET.com, http://www.cnet.com/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2006). 
133. See IMDb, The Internet Movie Database, http://www.imdb.com/ (last visited Oct. 
11, 2006); Wikipedia, Internet Movie Database, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IMDB (as of 
Sept. 24, 2006 00:36 GMT) ("The IMDb website consists of the largest known single accu-
mulation of data on individual films .... Information is largely provided by a cadre of 
volunteer contributors, with only 17 members of the staff dedicated to monitoring the data 
received."). 
134. Public Library of Science, Public Library of Science Announces PLoS ONE: A New 
Approach to Open-Access Publishing (June 7, 2006), http://www.plos.org/ 
news/announce _plosone.html. 
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These experiments with online collaboration have shown that of-
ten "ordinary" people possess extraordinary knowledge that they are 
willing to share when it is easy to do so. 135 Making participation open 
and subject to self-selection can leverage not only the "wisdom of the 
crowd"136 but also its enthusiasm. Experience with the tools now 
available is undermining traditional assumptions about how expertise 
must be organized and pointing the way toward the use of open mod-
els of scientific review to inform legal decision-making. 
Patent examination is well-suited to pre-grant community partici-
pation because it depends on scientific expertise to make the correct 
determination. Just as a community of open source programmers can 
better spot mistakes in code than one individual can,137 the applicable 
scientific and innovation community is better equipped to address the 
science found in patent applications. An examiner with access to lim-
ited information should not bear the sole responsibility of determining 
originality or obviousness when it is possible to harness the collective 
intelligence and experience of thousands. It is also illogical to tum to 
private firms to conduct this review, as the USPTO once suggested, 138 
because this simply replaces one closed group with another, and may 
still exclude those with the greatest expertise in a given area. 
Moreover, an open process for patent examination can encourage 
self-selection by those who are best equipped to contribute. 139 While a 
patent examiner might fruitlessly search for prior art for hours, if the 
process is open and publicly accessible, the appropriate expert is 
likely to know instantly whether an invention is reminiscent of earlier 
work or avenues of research. Expert public participation can provide 
the right information to the USPTO or otherwise guide the examiner's 
research. 
Technology is revolutionizing the capacity for purposive collec-
tive action: together we can accomplish what we cannot do alone. 140 
135. See Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of In-
formation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1256-57 (2003) (stating that peer production is the collabo-
rative process by which individuals "contribute to a joint effort" to produce "information or 
culture"); Benkler, supra note 25. 
136. See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004) (demonstrating how 
groups of people can be smarter and more effective than individuals at certain kinds of 
decisions). 
137. As Eric Raymond says, "given enough eyeballs, all [software] bugs are shallow." 
Eric S. Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar (Sept. 11, 2000), http://catb.org/--esr/ 
writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/index.html. 
138. See USPTO, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN 10 (2003), 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2 l/stratplan_ 03feb2003.pdf (proposing that the 
USPTO investigate market-driven initiatives to "achieve greater examiner productivity by 
reducing their prior art search responsibilities"). 
139. Cf STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 62 (2004) (describing the ad-
vantages of "voluntary participation and voluntary selection of tasks" in open source devel-
opment) (emphasis omitted). 
140.See Beth Simone Noveck, A Democracy of Groups, FIRST MONDAY, Nov. 2005, 
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue I 0_11 /noveck/. 
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The goal is to engineer the practices and the systems for an open col-
laborative information-gathering process to bring together the work of 
the scientist and the legal expert. Hopefully, this will improve gov-
ernmental decision-making. At the same time, such a process makes it 
possible for citizens to engage in deliberating around questions of 
public importance and to participate in the important decisions of our 
democracy, including the future of patent monopolies. 
The forthcoming USPTO Community Patent Review pilot, 
adopted based on an earlier draft of this article, will begin in April 
2007. With inventor consent, between 250 and 400 software-related 
patents will be submitted for open patent examination. Open review 
will supplement, not replace, substantive examination by a USPTO 
examiner. The process will augment the current rules that permit 
third-party submission of comments for a fee and in writing. For the 
first time, third parties will be able to submit prior art with commen-
tary online. To encourage participation, the USPTO will waive the fee 
for third party submissions. The USPTO will offer the added incentive 
of jumping consenting applicants to the front of the queue for expe-
dited review. 141 
The design of the pilot puts the idea of open review into practice 
by means of unique technology and legal process. This design is 
based upon normative democratic principles. The pilot should foster 
participatory practices that enable citizen engagement and govern-
mental accountability to a wider public. The process should be open, 
using not only open source software but also practices that are fully 
transparent. To that end, the pilot must maintain the same level of 
legitimacy and incorruptibility that characterizes traditional examina-
tion. Public involvement cannot come at the expense of corruption or 
undue influence. The pilot will be open to all those who want to par-
ticipate constructively. The attempt is to create institutional mecha-
nisms, not for any and all participation, but for informed, thoughtful 
participation that improves patent examination. Moderation, for this 
reason, is entirely appropriate. Ultimately, this pilot will demand, as 
the expression goes, "rough consensus and running code"142 - a will-
ingness to experiment and iterate by responding to feedback and im-
proving this new institution so that it serves its intended purposes 
while respecting core constitutional democratic values. 
The pilot has one goal: to ensure that the knowledgeable public 
can submit prior art relevant to the patent application's claims to the 
USPTO for consideration. 
141. For additional details, see generally Beth Simone Noveck, Community 
Patent Review Project Summary, http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/ 
p2p _exec _sum_ sep _ 06.pdf. 
142. Cf Paul Hoffman & Susan Harris, The Tao oflETF: A Novice's Guide to the Inter-
net Engineering Task Force, http://www.ietf.org/tao.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2006) (de-
scribing phrase as a "founding belief' of the IETF). 
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Under the terms of the program, patent applicants may request re-
view of their patent application under the Community Patent Review 
process. Once an applicant makes the request and files a consent with 
the USPTO, a copy of their patent application will be transferred to 
the Peer-to-Patent software system for a period of review. Each appli-
cation will reside on a webpage where users can submit relevant prior 
art for two months. The two-month window tracks the amount of time 
currently available to members of the public wishing to submit written 
prior art under Rule 1.99.143 Limiting the time for submission will 
ensure that excessive volume does not overload the patent examiner 
or delay substantive patent examination. It may also create an impetus 
to participate by offering enough time for thoughtful work without 
inducing delay. On the basis of experimentation, the window for input 
may be increased to four or more months. 
To ensure that those with the necessary know-how can navigate 
to the right patent application, the design of the software system must 
be optimized to ensure participation. Potential contributors can search 
applications, share them with colleagues, and subscribe to receive 
notifications and updates. Visualization aids will help contributors 
track the level and contentiousness of activity around a particular pat-
ent application. These aids may not only help to make information 
about the patent application visible to participants, but also make help 
the community involved in submitting prior art more self-aware. To 
suggest patents to review, the system might employ a collaborative 
filtering system akin to Amazon's - prompting users with statements 
such as "People who submitted prior art for this patent also read Pat-
ent X." 
In addition, reviewers can "tag" or label applications with their 
own designations. While patents are officially classified by the 
USPTO, this kind of supplementary community self-tagging, called a 
"folksonomy," 144 might make it easier to find applications of interest 
by allowing experts to apply other labels to identify an invention in 
the terminology that is common to his or her specialty. For example, a 
member of what the USPTO calls Class 482 Exercise Devices145 
might commonly be known among physical therapists as an "elliptical 
machine." A reviewer might label a device classified under Class 438 
Semiconductor Device Manufacturing as a "chip." By making label-
143. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
144. See Wikipedia, Fo/ksonomy, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Folksonomy (as of Sept. 
27, 2006, 23:36 GMT); see also Clay Shirky, Ontology is Overrated: Categories, Links, and 
Tags, http://www.shirky.com/writings/ontology_overrated.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2006). 
145. The Patent Classification System can be found online, arranged alphabetically, by 
subject matter, by class number, and by art unit. See Office of Patent Classification, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/opc/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2006). 
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ing more granular and precise, such a folksonomy could help con-
tributors self-assign to areas of interest. 146 
To ensure that contributors can submit prior art in ways that make 
participation easy for the contributor but manageable to read for the 
patent examiner, the system will offer a variety of participation op-
tions, some of which will demand more commitment than others. 
These include rating patent claims, submitting examples of prior art, 
commenting on prior art submissions, ranking prior art submissions, 
and rating other contributors. 
In order not to wind up the machinery of peer review where it is 
not needed, the system must channel the expertise of the community 
where it is most useful. Because current law does not permit the ex-
aminer to communicate with the public to indicate which claims are 
the most important, the software will allow the community to provide 
this direction. Users can vote on the most critical claims where re-
search should be focused. For instance, an application might recite a 
method for sending and receiving electronic signals by means of a 
special hash algorithm. The examiner does not need prior art pertain-
ing to sending and receiving, which are common steps. Rather, the 
community's attention should be directed to finding prior art pertain-
ing to the hash algorithm. 
Contributors will collaborate to submit and annotate prior art to 
assist the examiner with the patent application review process. This 
will require the contributor to identify the claims to which a piece of 
prior art pertains, whether it predates the invention at issue, and the 
reasons the submitter believes the prior art relates to the conditions for 
patentability. Unlike the current paper-based system, in the pilot, the 
contributor must provide this commentary along with the submission 
to demonstrate relevance. For a pilot, applicants can consent to re-
ceive commentary. Eventually, the law might be changed to permit 
third-party comment on pre-grant submissions. Contributors can col-
laborate online to provide that commentary in order to understand 
thoroughly the relevance of a submission to a given claim. 
Directions, instruction, and even moderation will be essential to 
educate the community about useful and appropriate submissions. The 
software can do some of the "heavy lifting" to ensure that submissions 
are provided in the appropriate form. For example, if the date of the 
prior art submission does not predate the invention, it will automati-
cally be rejected. If the date is falsified or mistyped, however, a hu-
man moderator can reject a submission before it is posted publicly 
online. Members of the participating peer review community will be 
146. User created taxonomy and classification systems have been proposed in other dis-
ciplines. See Andrew Polaszek, Commentary, A Universal Register for Animal Names, 437 
NATURE 477 (2005). Existing websites have already implemented similar technology. See, 
e.g., del.icio.us About Page, http://del.icio.us/doc/about (last visited Sept. 28, 2006). 
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able to improve the quality of information by annotating a prior art 
submission, providing additional bibliographic information, direction, 
and commentary. 
A prior art submission must contain enough bibliographic and 
substantive information to allow other contributors to view and com-
ment on it, such as a patent number or a URL. Where information is 
available only in hard copy, relevant portions might be excerpted and 
posted online, or the entire document might be scanned in and made 
available. In all cases, a complete copy must be transmitted to the 
USPTO for consideration as part of the legal record. 
The information shared as part of the public review process must 
comply with the relevant laws, including copyright law. Where con-
tributors are sharing patents or other public domain material as prior 
art, there are no copyright concerns But when a contributor wishes to 
upload a copy of a copyrighted journal or magazine article, computer 
code, or other information, this could give rise to liability for copy-
right infringement for the contributor as well as secondary liability for 
those administering the Community Patent Review project. When the 
desired information is freely available online, problems can be averted 
by linking to third party websites. The Peer-to-Patent system will re-
quire the inclusion of a URL. Where information is in hard copy or 
otherwise not freely available online (for example, a password-
protected journal website), an excerpt or quote can be shared publicly 
under the doctrine of fair use. 147 In this case, I would argue that it is 
fair use even if a user uploads and the software transmits a single copy 
of the information privately to the USPTO so long as it is not made 
accessible or visible to the public. It might also be fair use to display a 
single locked-down copy on the website along with a notice and take-
down policy to offer copyright holders some recourse. 148 This may 
not, however, completely protect the contributor who scanned and 
uploaded a copyrighted document for this purpose. Thus, while it will 
be preferable to rely on the use of licensed and public domain works, 
the project might also necessitate testing the boundaries of fair use, 
though, arguably, with very low risk. It may also be possible to obtain 
licenses from scientific and technical publications to use their work in 
connection with this project. 
To succeed, this process must uncover useful and relevant prior 
art without overwhelming the patent examiner with information. 
Community Patent Review will allow the Peer-to-Patent community 
to rate the prior art for relevance, creating a searchable and sorted list 
147. See 17 U.S.C. § I 07 (2000). 
148. See 17 U.S.C. § 5 I 2(c) (2000). 
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of infonnation for the USPT0. 149 If users assign a numerical rating to 
a third party submission, software will be able to automatically sort 
the material, outputting a list of the top ten submissions as judged by 
the community. The system will forward only that "top ten" list to the 
examiner. This winnows the submissions, making them more man-
ageable for the examiner. Presumably, it will also cause the best sub-
missions to rise to the top. Eventually, additional rating schemes, 
including evaluative criteria provided by private systems, might be 
incorporated to enhance the quality of available infonnation. 
While software will automatically forward the top ten submis-
sions to the USPTO at the end of the allotted time, the examiner will 
still have access to the full list, which she can search as she would any 
database. Those ten references can also be forwarded to the examiner 
in the fonnat typically used by examiners when creating search re-
ports.150 The examiner can use as few or as many of the public sub-
missions as she desires. 
There is always the danger that competitors, ideologues, and van-
dals will attempt to game any rating system. Given the high economic 
stakes, it is likely that various parties will seek ways to cheat, whether 
to improve the standing of their own submissions of prior art or to 
suppress valid prior art submitted to defeat their own patents. While it 
is desirable for anyone, including competitors, to dig up the best prior 
art, the software must control against participants voting "early and 
often" and thereby skewing the ratings. In addition to technical track-
ing mechanisms that log which computer does the voting, clear tenns 
of service must forbid any gaming of the rating system. Transparency 
in the voting process will also help to quell any impulses toward falsi-
fication. 
However, even if the system is ultimately compromised, substan-
tive patent examination is not harmed. Unlike Wikipedia, where gen-
erally any participant can change an entry, in Community Patent 
Review the patent examiner remains the ultimate decision-maker. The 
community review process does not derail substantive patent exami-
nation. 
Finally, to encourage worthwhile participation and reward exper-
tise in patent examination research, the system will award reputation 
points. Just as on eBay, where the point system signals who is a trust-
149. Digg, a "user powered" news site," organizes its content based on similar principles. 
The community decides which contributors and content are best and corresponding informa-
tion rises to the top. See digg: All, http://digg.com/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2006). 
150. These requirements are similar to those of an International Search Report filed by an 
examiner in a Patent Cooperation Treaty ("PCT") review. In such a report, the examiner 
cites prior art, indicates the claim to which such prior art speaks, and codes the relevance of 
the submission. See MPEP, supra note 4, § 1844.01. 
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worthy buyer or seller,151 a similar reputation system here could be 
used to signal expertise. These "karma effects" will accrue from sub-
jective and objective criteria. Subjective rewards come from submit-
ting prior art that is deemed relevant by the community. 152 Objective 
rewards come from submitting prior art that is used by the patent ex-
aminer in making her determination. This might encourage participa-
tion, for example, by graduate students or junior scientists, eager for 
professional recognition. The inventor might even extend a job offer 
to a contributor with a high rating who submitted useful information 
for the review of his application. While participants will be allowed 
and encouraged to submit information about their "real world" iden-
tity and education, status will not be measured on the basis of these 
traditional measures of expertise. Amateurs are capable of submitting 
worthwhile prior art. Additionally, professionals may be reluctant to 
identify themselves, uncertain about the appropriateness of participat-
ing in patent review on the job. 153 Hence the Peer to Patent software 
should measure expertise based on the quality of participation in this 
process, rather than with reference to external criteria. 
151. For a description of eBay's rating system, see Evaluating a Member's Reputation, 
http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/evaluating-feedback.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2006). 
See also Peter Kollock, The Production of Trust in Online Markets, 16 ADVANCES GROUP 
PROCESSES 99, I 00 (1999) ("Separating the two sides of the transaction by time or space 
(such as purchasing something by mail or on credit) introduces greater risks. The party who 
moves second must be considered trustworthy or have some other form of guarantee."). 
152. There are numerous existing social reputation software systems. Some focus on 
building social trust to support online social or dating relationships. These generally rate 
participants based on whom they know, such as MySpace or Facebook. See MySpace, 
http://www.myspace.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2006); Facebook, http://www.facebook.com 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2006). Others, like Linkedln, provide a map of business relationships. 
See Welcome to Linkedln, http://www.linkedin.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2006). Epinions 
bills itself as a "web of trust" system that builds social networks of product reviewers. See 
Reviews from Epinions, http://www.epinions.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2006). Kuro5hin 
employs a time-weighted average of ratings to sort comments. See kuro5hin.org, FAQ -
Comments, http://www.kuro5hin.org/?op=special;page=comments (last visited Nov. 19, 
2006). For additional examples, see Beth Simone Noveck, Trademark law and the Social 
Construction of Trust: Creating the legal Framework for Online Identity, 83 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1733, 1752 & n.74 (2005). 
153. Of course, this need not be the case. See Steven Lohr, Hoping to Be a Model, 1.8.M. 
Will Put Its Patent Filings Online, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at CS ("l.B.M. also said that 
its technical experts will spend 'thousands of hours' a year scrutinizing the patent filings of 
other companies."). 
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By adding these mechanisms for public participation in the re-
view of patent applications, it will hopefully be possible to empiri-
cally test the impact of the project on the quality of expertise and 
participation, on examiner decision-making, and, ultimately, on the 
resulting quality of the issued patent. By means of automated and 
manual data collection during the course of the pilot, it will be possi-
ble to test the major hypotheses of the project: first, that the public is 
capable of self-selecting on the basis of expertise and producing in-
formation relevant to the patent examination process; second, that an 
open, human network of expertise will improve examiner work and 
work product; and finally, that a publicly reviewed patent will satisfy 
statutory criteria and, ultimately, result in greater licensing revenue 
and lower litigation costs. With evidence that such a process is useful, 
it will be possible to justify expanding this pilot program into institu-
tionalized practice. It might also induce a change in the law to allow 
examiners to communicate directly with the scientific public. 
V. WHY OPEN REVIEW? 
The Community Patent Review project opens up the process of 
researching prior art to the public by dividing the prior art submission 
process into manageable tasks: (1) submission of prior art and com-
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mentary in response to the pending application of a consenting appli-
cant; (2) community identification of the claims that are most rele-
vant; (3) generation of positive reputation points by successful 
participation; and (4) automated transmission of information to the 
patent examiner. This model of participation attempts to address the 
problems of closed peer review while introducing more information 
into the decision-making process. 
There are strong reasons why inventors, examiners, and peer re-
viewers will want to participate in such a system. 
A. For the Inventor 
Inventors seek better information in order to strengthen their pat-
ent application. They want to know about relevant prior art before the 
patent issues in order to avoid the cost of unnecessary litigation later. 
Community Patent Review should help inventors uncover relevant 
prior art through community vetting. As Professor Peter Canelias put 
it, this system "affords the only real opportunity to implement the 
statutory standard for obviousness."154 By decreasing the probability 
of later litigation, peer review should produce a stronger and more 
valuable patent. Thus, inventors who prosecute through the peer re-
view process should be able to extract more value when licensing 
their patents than those who do not. 
B. For the Patent Examiner 
Examiners fear that public participation will create more work. 
Furthermore, the USPTO, whose operations have been criticized, does 
not want to expend any political capital on ineffective reforms. This 
proposal is sensitive to these needs by supplying the examiner with an 
independently generated "top ten" list of prior art references. This will 
help produce information that is directly useful and also allow the 
examiner to perform a more targeted and efficient search of the prior 
art on the basis of know-how submitted by this "living database" of 
human researchers. By virtue of having many public readers, appli-
cants may write better-researched applications which, in tum, improve 
examiner search practices. But even if Community Patent Review 
154. E-mail from Peter Canelias, Adjunct Professor, New York Law School, to author 
(Mar. 17, 2006, 18:26:56 EST) (on file with author). He continued: 
Id. 
[A] timely intervention by such a person is worth 10 expert witnesses 
I 0 years after the fact. It also helps crystallize the knowledge in the 
art within a particular time frame. One of the great difficulties in pat-
ent litigation, particularly with software, is reconstructing prior art 
methods that were known to exist at the time of the invention, but 
cannot be resurrected in sufficient detail to constitute clear and con-
vincing evidence. 
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does create more work for an examiner, if this cost comes with the 
benefit of higher quality patents, it may be worth bearing. 
C. For the Peer Reviewer 
For peer contributors to participate, there must be tangible bene-
fits to participation that outweigh the investment in time. The oppor-
tunity to produce better patent quality in their area of scientific 
invention will motivate scientists. By increasing confidence in the 
patent system, peer review can promote innovation, which benefits 
everyone. Participation is more likely when participants know that 
their contributions are likely to influence the final decision. In this 
project, public participation will be tied directly to examiner decision-
making. The software transmits contributed prior art directly to the 
USPTO to ensure that there will be a meaningful connection between 
reviewers' contributions and the final decision. In addition, contribu-
tors will be able to participate to varying degrees. While one might do 
the necessary research to submit prior art, another might choose only 
to rate the prior art submitted by another. 
D. Public Benefits 
In the United States, millions of dollars are spent on unnecessary 
litigation and unjustified settlements that arise from patents that never 
should have been issued. For the public, the primary goal is to im-
prove the patent system. Community Patent Review addresses the 
public interest by creating a system that could introduce more infor-
mation into the process, defeating non-meritorious patent claims be-
fore they issue. The program aims to achieve that without falling into 
the pitfalls of traditional peer review. 
There are numerous aspects of the system's design that attempt to 
improve the quality of issued patents, but openness is at the core of 
the solution. Dismantling the institutionalized boundaries of insular 
expertise allows public participants to self-select and introduce infor-
mation into the process, transforming the fictional "person having 
ordinary skill in the art" into a reality. 155 Open review jettisons the 
classical conception of expertise. Philip Kitchner describes it: 
155. Other proposals have sought to ground the PH OS IT A standard in reality by creating 
incentives for the public to submit prior art. See, e.g., John R. Thomas, Collusion and Col-
lective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
305 (200 I) (arguing that by awarding prior art informants with a bounty assessed against 
applicants, the USPTO can restore order to the patent system and reduce its social costs); 
Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating 
Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667 (2004); see also Michael J. Felton, A Cal/for Bounty 
Hunters, PATENTS & PROP., Mar. 2001, at 57-58, available at http://pubs.acs.org/ 
subscribe/joumals/mdd/v04/i03/html/03patents.html (discussing a website that implements a 
patent bounty by offering a reward for information that leads to the invalidation of a patent). 
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When a handful of distinguished gentlemen came to-
gether in post-Restoration England to set up the 
Royal Society, they agreed that membership should 
be open only to the better sort. Allowing tradesmen 
and artisans to join the collective search for truth 
seemed too dangerous to be tolerated, for, after all, 
the worldly interests of such people might corrupt 
their decisions about what counted as genuine 
knowledge. 156 
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If the aim is to find relevant prior art, the best knowledge may not 
come from the center, but from the periphery, among the enthusiasts 
or graduate students who are immersed in, but not yet well known for, 
their knowledge of the discipline. 
Opening up review will enable as many parties as possible to 
monitor the peer review process. Participants will not be constrained 
by professional allegiances. If successful, open peer review will re-
semble a scholarly debate - an open playing field where everyone 
participates in a common conversation, whether they are in academia, 
industry, or the public sector. This will not only inform the patent ex-
amination process, but also illuminate broader scientific debates. 157 
The benefits of open review may extend beyond the process of 
patent examination. Open review promotes deliberation about issues 
of national importance, promoting social cohesion and good citizen-
ship.158 Engaging the scientific community in patent review promotes 
science education and science literacy. It puts scientific knowledge to 
work for public purposes and democratizes the national conversation 
about science and innovation. 
Finally, open review increases public oversight over the regula-
tory process. It allows the public not only to vet but also to produce 
the information on which regulatory decisions are based. This is espe-
cially valuable in the case of patent examination because the examiner 
often does not possess the requisite information or understanding to 
make informed decisions. 
156. PHILIP KITCHER, SCIENCE, TRUTH, AND DEMOCRACY 29 (200 l ). 
157. Openness and independence are critical to effective scientific discussion. See, e.g., 
E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science's Voice at EPA, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 
46 (2003) ("(G]ood science is a chorus of independent expert voices that come together with 
sufficient coherence and force to constrain policy, structure debate, and influence policy.") 
(footnote omitted). 
158. See Reich, supra note 118, at 1631-32 ("[P]ublic deliberation helps transform indi-
vidual valuations into social values; it helps forge collective purposes, and, even more im-
portant, helps define and refine public morality. Through such deliberations, individuals 
become citizens.") (emphasis in original); see also Beth Simone Noveck, Designing Delib-
erative Democracy in Cyberspace: The Role of the Cyber-Lawyer, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 
1 (2003). 
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Unlike a traditional peer review solution, an open review process 
like Community Patent Review may be more expert and more partici-
patory than both the status quo of patent examination and the closed 
systems of scientific peer review employed in other agencies. This 
model opens the policymaking process to more members of the scien-
tific community and provides a platform to organize and evaluate 
their input. 
E. Possible Questions 
The incentives for open patent review and participation in the 
Commmunity Patent Review pilot are clear and powerful. Nonethe-
less, the proposed system is a significant departure from years of pat-
ent practice. As a result, I anticipate criticisms and questions to which 
this Part will respond. 
Could competitors use this system to misappropriate confidential 
business information, suppressing innovation? 
The Supreme Court has stated, 
the pressure for secrecy is easily exaggerated, for if 
the inventor of a process cannot himself ascertain a 
'use' for that which his process yields, he has every 
incentive to make his invention known to those able 
to do so. Finally, how likely is disclosure of a pat-
ented process to spur research by others into the uses 
to which the product may be put? To the extent that 
the patentee has power to enforce his patent, there is 
little incentive for others to undertake a search for 
uses. 159 
When an applicant files for a patent, it comes with the require-
ment of public information disclosure. Today, most applications are 
published eighteen months after filing. Even if the inventor is taking 
some risk with his disclosure, that risk is only of foregoing trade se-
cret protection. The cost of disclosure to the inventor is small com-
pared to the cost imposed on the public by a patent monopoly. If the 
patentee does not want to forgo secrecy or does not feel that the patent 
is meritorious enough to receive protection, he should not file for a 
patent. There is no added harm associated with facilitating research 
into the application, and, in fact, innovation might benefit from this 
forum for discussion of pending patent applications. Tellingly, many 
159. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966). 
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companies have already consented to participate in Community Patent 
Review. 
Could contributing prior art in Community Patent Review create 
the risk of increased liability for willful infringement? 
Willful infringement imposes treble damages when an infringer 
deliberately copies another's patented invention. 160 However, knowl-
edge of a pending application is generally insufficient to establish 
willfulness. 161 Participation in the program occurs pre-grant, which 
likely implies that courts will not find membership in the Peer-to-
Patent community probative of willfulness in later litigation. 162 Penal-
izing participation in a public forum for researching prior art also con-
travenes the public policy of the patent system. 
This proposal is too radical. How can the USPTO put the fate of 
innovators in the hands of the public? 
The Community Patent Review pilot does not eliminate the 
USPTO, nor does it alter the substantive statutory standards used in 
reviewing inventions. It preserves the scheme that has been in place 
since 1952.163 Open review merely augments that scheme with a non-
expert institution akin to the jury system, a "radical" institution that 
has been used since the 13th century. 164 
Participants will game the system. How can you ensure that peo-
ple won't place speed bumps and stumbling blocks in the path of their 
competitors? 
If people produce information that is useful to the examiner, their 
personal agendas are irrelevant. Having many participants in the proc-
ess will dilute the effects of unconstructive users. In existing social 
160. See Chaparral Indus., Inc. v. Boman Indus., Inc., 697 F. Supp. 1113, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 
1988). 
161. See State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
162. See Yeen C. Tham, Memorandum on Willful Infringement and Community Patent 
Review (Sept. 11, 2006), http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/willfulinfringement.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2006). 
163. The examination system has remained largely unchanged since the Patent Act of 
1952. See Christopher M. Holman, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 318, 318 (2006) 
(observing that the now-dormant Patent Reform Act of 2005 "would have constituted the 
most substantial and comprehensive package of patent law reforms since the Patent Act of 
1952"). 
164. The use of a jury in English trials dates from 1215. Danny Danziger & John Gilling-
ham, 1215: THE YEAR OF MAGNA CARTA 187 (Touchstone 2004)(2003). 
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reputation system, norms frequently evolve to safeguard the quality of 
participation. 165 We can expect something similar to happen here. 
In addition, direct competitors might be prevented from rating a 
particular invention. It is unproblematic to require each participant to 
sign an affidavit representing that she does not have a conflict of in-
terest. The National Science Foundation,166 the National Research 
Council, 167 and the National Institutes of Health168 all have well-
established regulations and disclosure requirements to weed out con-
flicts among peer-review participants. The Community Patent Review 
pilot could institute a similar policy. 
Won't allowing non-governmental persons to have input into the 
decision-making process decrease the system's impartiality? 
You couldn't have a greater risk of bias than in the current sys-
tem, in which a lone patent examiner rules on innovation without pub-
lic oversight or review. The "wisdom of crowds" is generally more 
accurate and more objective than the judgment of one uninformed 
"expert."169 
Due to increased scrutiny, this program will effectively increase 
the standard of review during the application process. If instituted in 
widespread practice, wouldn't such a system cause fewer people to 
apply for patents? 
If those patents that remain untiled would not have survived the 
threshold of public scrutiny, then this is a positive development. The 
scientists, innovators, and inventors participating as contributing re-
viewers also rely on patents in their own work. While there are com-
petitive economic interests that might create an incentive to submit 
challenging prior art, the collective economic interests of the commu-
nity drive towards producing the best quality patents. Only those pat-
ents that satisfy the statutory criteria ought to be granted. 
165. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
166. See NAT'L SCI. FOUND., REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD ON THE NA-
TIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION'S MERIT REVIEW PROCES FISCAL YEAR 2005 14 (2006), 
http://www.nsf.gov/nsb/documents/2006/0306/merit_review.pdf. 
167. See The Nat'! Acads., Policy on Committee Composition and Balance and Conflicts 
of Interest for Committees Used in the Development of Reports (May 12, 2003), 
http://www.nationalacademies.org/coi/bi-coi_form-O.pdf. 
168. See Nat'! lnsts. of Health, NIH Conflict of Interest, Confidentiality and Non Disclo-
sure Rules: Information for Reviewers of Grant Applications and R&D Contract Proposals 
(Jan. 12, 2005), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/peer/COI_Information.pdf. 
169. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 136, at xv. 
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There are still an enormous number of patent applications.170 If 
Community Patent Review is expanded, won't the workload be too 
great for these non-professional peer contributors? 
The pilot does not ask laypersons to be patent examiners but 
merely to submit bibliographic information about that which they al-
ready know in their roles as scientists or innovators. Experts can 
quickly answer questions in their field that identify prior art. The sys-
tem's division of work allows for small "chunks" of participation. 
Thus experts can make meaningful contributions to the community 
without devoting large blocks of their schedule to Community Patent 
Review. There are plenty of scientists, engineers, economists, con-
sultants, and other professionals eligible to participate, especially 
given that the grant of a twenty-year period of exclusivity is so eco-
nomically significant to the future of science and industry. If the Na-
tional Science Foundation can tap the more than 50,000 natural 
scientists in the United States to review grant applications, the 
USPTO should be able to solicit the participation of a vastly wider 
network of experts - including those scientists for whom funding 
depends on revenues from lucrative university patents. 
If Community Patent Review were expanded from a pilot to a 
more widespread system, there is also no need to ask the public to 
review every patent. Attention could be directed only where the exam-
iners encounter difficulties with their searching. 
"Rational ignorance "171 is intentionally built into the patent sys-
tem. Since most patents are never litigated or even licensed, spending 
too much time and money on initial review is a waste and "decisions 
can be made much more efficiently in litigation. "172 Why invest in 
process review? 
Mark Lemley's critique of ex ante reform did not consider the 
possibility that additional prosecution costs could be borne by a "third 
party" to the proceedings. Thus by engaging an outside community, 
Community Patent Review sidesteps this problem. At the same time, 
the program may reduce the costs of litigation by ensuring that patents 
170. Inventors filed 409,532 patent applications in fiscal year 2005. See ANNUAL RE-
PORT, supra note 12, at 119 tbl. 2. 
171. Lemley, supra note 37, at 1495. 
172. Id. at 1531; see id. at 1510-11 ("[S]ociety ought to resign itself to the fact that bad 
patents will issue, and attempt to deal with the problem ex post, if the patent is asserted in 
litigation. This result is admittedly counterintuitive. It depends crucially on the fact that very 
few patents are ever the subject of litigation, or even licensing. Because of this, money spent 
improving the PTO examination procedures will largely be wasted on examining the ninety-
five percent of patents that will either never be used, or will be used in circumstances that 
don't crucially rely on the determination of validity.") (footnote omitted). 
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issued with public scrutiny are stronger and more litigation-resistant. 
Furthermore, this critique ignores the Supreme Court's clear statement 
in a seminal patent case that "primary responsibility for sifting out 
unpatentable material lies in the Patent Office" and "[t]o await litiga-
tion is - for all practical purposes - to debilitate the patent sys-
tem."173 If the examiner, inventor, and the public can share the 
burden, more information might be introduced into the process. 
There will be too few participants. How will you recruit? 
Building the community to participate in patent examination is 
the greatest challenge. Even with the best technology and most con-
sidered process, without contributors the system will fail. 
Fortunately, recruitment for the pilot has already begun. All the 
companies that have volunteered their patents for peer review, includ-
ing IBM and Microsoft, have committed to have their employees par-
ticipate as peer reviewers. In the patenting process, the stakes are high 
and self-interest will motivate participation. For many, the desire to 
ensure that unpatentable subject matter in their area of art does not 
pass muster will further motivate involvement. Moreover, the pilot 
will focus on Technology Center 2100, 174 which concentrates on 
software-related patents. 175 This should engage a large community of 
software developers with a strong spirit of volunteerism. There are 
also many within that community who oppose patenting176 and will 
want to participate in an effort to defeat bad patents. 
Further recruitment initiatives will solicit participation from in-
dustry, universities, and academic technology transfer offices. Gradu-
ate students will want to participate in order to increase their standing 
in the scientific community and gain recognition in their communities 
of practice. 
Finally, it is worth noting that over one million Wikipedia entries 
are managed largely by only one thousand administrators. 177 
173. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966). 
174. For a list of the US PTO Technology Centers, see US PTO, Patent Technology Cen-
ters, http://www.uspto.gov/web/info/pat-tech.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2006). 
175. See Patent Technology Center 2100 Contact Info, http://www.uspto.gov/web/ 
info/2100.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2006). 
I 76. See, e.g., Richard Stallman, Patent Absurdity, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, June 5, 2004, 
http://technology.guardian.co.uk/online/comment/story/O, 12449, 1510566,00.html. 
177. See Wikipedia, Wikipedia: List of Administrators, http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Wikipedia:List_of_administrators (as of Nov. 19, 2006, 16:30 GMT). 
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It will be hard to coordinate all these people. How will it be man-
aged? 
Many large systems like the program contemplated here have 
operated successfully online. Their success stems from having well-
thought out practices that allow participants to see clearly the com-
munity of which they are a part, to understand their role within the 
group, to participate simply and easily in the process, and to see the 
outcome. If eBay can coordinate millions of auctions every day, 178 
then this modest pilot can be built, leaving opportunities to evolve and 
improve over time. 
Don't small inventors stand to suffer from this process? Won't 
this increase the costs of obtaining a patent and the risk that it will 
not be granted? 
Small inventions receive equal consideration in this system and 
even the work of unknown inventors may receive useful attention 
from the community. While some patent applications may be of 
greater interest to the public than others, public willingness to partici-
pate is not contingent upon the size of the inventor. This process does 
not delay substantive examination. To the contrary, participation 
speeds up consideration by allowing all applicants, regardless of size, 
to be reviewed first. Applicants are not obligated to review every 
piece of information found by the public nor are they required to 
amend their information disclosure statements before the USPTO. The 
Community Patent Review system functions as an adjunct search ser-
vice for the examination. It does not alter the obligations of the pat-
entee. The USPTO will provide this assurance to consenting 
applicants who participate in the pilot. 
Can this process be privatized? 
Possibly. A peer review process will be most effective and create 
the greatest incentives for participation if it meaningfully connects to 
administrative process. A direct connection to a legal decision-making 
process confers legitimacy and relevance on peer review. At the same 
time, private third parties are already offering services to discuss and 
deliberate about granted (and, increasingly, published) patents. 179 It is 
178. See eBay: The World's Online Marketplace, http://pages.ebay.com/aboutebay/ 
thecompany/companyoverview.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2006) ("On any given day, there 
are millions of items available through auction-style and fixed-price trading."). 
179. See, e.g., WikiPatents- Community Patent Review, http://www.wikipatents.com 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2006); About the CAMBIA Patent Lens, http://www.patentlens.net/ 
daisy/patentlens/patentlens.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2006); EFF: Patent Busting Project, 
http://www.eff.org/patent/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2006). 
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possible that these approaches can be combined. The Peer to Patent 
system might act as a conduit through which third-party data could be 
channeled to the USPTO. 
If we implement open review, what happens to the prosecution 
history? How will a record be created for litigation? 
The Peer to Patent process creates a strong, robust, and informed 
record for review. With the entire peer review process conducted 
online, it can be recorded and archived in its entirety, making infor-
mation also accessible to the inventor. Only information transmitted 
to the examiner will form part of the record, just as in any examiner 
search. 
VI. CONCLUSION: INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE AND PA TENT 
REFORM 
Patent reform has been incremental at best, with no major 
changes to the examination system since the Patent Act was enacted 
in 1952. Open review presents an alternative avenue for legal reform 
by enhancing the institutional competence of the USPTO. This pro-
posal focuses on the institution that makes the decisions, employing 
technologically-enhanced information and communications practices 
to improve its work. Instead of seeking reform through the slower 
mechanisms of judicial review, this proposal addresses its administra-
tive law antecedents by revolutionizing the process of patent examina-
tion. 
Moreover, even if we were to change the legislative standards by 
which patent determinations are made, without adequate information 
to enable good decisions, meaningful reform is not possible. Agencies 
depend on good information to do their work - whether it is deter-
mining patentability or air quality standards - and the Patent Office 
currently lacks the institutional mechanisms and culture to benefit 
from outside expertise. 
The pilot program could also spur empirical and data-driven re-
form.180 The legal profession often prefers "anecdotes to tables,"181 
and legislative change is not necessarily supported by empirical 
data. 182 Introducing a verifiable process makes it possible to test its 
180. Cf David A. Hyman, An Outsider Per~pective on Intellectual Property Discourse, 
in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 275, 278 (F. Scott 
Kieff ed., 2003) (discussing evident lack of concern about the dearth of empirical evidence 
in legal scholarship). 
181. Id. at 279. 
182. See David A. Hyman, lies, Damn lies, and Narrative, 73 IND. L.J. 797, 836-37 
( 1998) (noting that anecdotal evidence can be exploited to produce legislative change that is 
unjustified by empirical data). 
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impact on the patent system and ascertain if the measure truly pro-
motes the progress of the "useful arts." Rather than prompting pro-
longed guesswork as to which legal reforms will address the patent 
crisis - wondering whether a change in the standard of judicial re-
view or a reform of the obviousness standard will, in fact, improve 
patent quality - open patent review will both create and stimulate 
progress. Information from the pilot can be used to inform examina-
tion and see what works and what does not. We can then lobby Con-
gress for more thoroughgoing legislative change, armed with concrete 
data. Furthermore, the results of this program will help us develop 
new models and new technologies that will solicit public input to im-
prove regulatory decision-making. 
The new type of digital institution for which this Article argues 
combines scientific and legal decision-making using online tools. In-
stead of one examiner, an application can have a thousand! The new 
generation of social software might not only make it easier to find 
friends but also to find expertise that can be applied to legal and pol-
icy decision-making. 183 This way, we can improve upon the Constitu-
tional promise to promote the progress of science and the useful arts 
in our democracy by ensuring that only worthy ideas receive that 
"odious monopoly" of which Thomas Jefferson complained. 184 
183. See CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, PROGRESSIVE PRIORITIES: AN ACTION 
AGENDA FOR AMERICA 253 (2005), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/projects/ 
progressivepriorities/prog_priorities.pdf. 
184. See Walterscheid, supra note 7 (noting that Jefferson was "not convinced" that the 
Patent Act of 1793 was "either desirable or particularly useful"). Along the same lines, 
Irving Wladawsky-Berger, IBM Vice President of Technology and Strategy, said of the U.S. 
Patent Office, "[A]ny idiot can get a patent for something that should never be granted a 
patent." Robert McMillan, IBM Exec: U.S. Could learn from EU, China Patent Policy, 
INFOWORLD, Apr. 7, 2005, available at http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/04/07/ 
HNpatentpolicy _ l .html. 
